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IMPACT OF CLAN CONTROL ON THE EXECUTION OF DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION INITIATIVES IN KENYA

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Abstract:

Purpose: This study examined the impact of clan-based control on the execution of departmental initiatives within the Department of Immigration Services in Kenya, focusing on implications for administrative effectiveness, national security, and public trust.

Methodology: Guided by Agency Theory, the study tested the null hypothesis that clan control has no significant influence on the execution of immigration initiatives. A quantitative research design was employed. Data were collected from 60 respondents within the Department and analyzed using simple linear regression to estimate the effect

of clan control on initiative execution performance.

Findings: The results indicated a strong and statistically significant negative relationship between clan control and initiative execution ($R = 0.654$; $R^2 = 0.428$; $p < 0.001$). Clan control accounted for 42.8% of the variance in execution performance. The regression coefficient ($\beta = -0.726$) showed that higher levels of clan influence substantially reduce effective implementation. The overall model was statistically significant ($F = 43.737$; $p < 0.001$).

Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: The study extends Agency Theory to clan-based governance dynamics in public administration by empirically demonstrating how informal power structures distort principal-agent relationships. Practically, it provides evidence for strengthening merit-based recruitment, accountability mechanisms, ethical leadership, and digitized service delivery to limit discretionary capture. From a policy perspective, the findings support institutional reforms that enhance transparency and integrity in immigration governance.

Keywords: *Clan control, immigration initiatives, initiative execution, Agency Theory, merit-based systems, organizational performance, Kenya*

JEL CODES: *D73, H11, O17, Z13 and C12*

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

Clan control refers to the influence of kinship, lineage, or ethnic-based networks on decision-making, recruitment, resource allocation, and administrative processes within public institutions. In many developing countries, formal bureaucratic structures operate alongside strong informal social systems that shape how authority is exercised. While such networks may promote solidarity and social cohesion, they can also affect institutional performance when loyalty considerations override merit and procedural standards (Sahharon et al., 2023). In public administration, effective execution of government initiatives depends on professionalism, transparency, and adherence to established regulations. Where informal influence dominates formal systems, implementation efficiency and accountability may be compromised.

The Department of Immigration Services in Kenya is mandated to manage border control, passport issuance, citizenship registration, and enforcement of immigration laws. These functions are critical for national security, economic growth, and international cooperation. Globally, immigration governance has become increasingly complex due to globalization, transnational mobility, and security threats. Effective immigration systems require strong institutional integrity and impartial enforcement mechanisms (Armenta, 2017). The success of immigration initiatives therefore depends on consistent application of procedures, ethical conduct, and merit-based decision-making. Empirical research demonstrates that governance quality significantly affects public sector performance. The World Bank (2023) emphasizes that institutions characterized by accountability and rule-based systems are more likely to achieve policy objectives effectively. Conversely, where favoritism and informal patronage networks influence public administration, service delivery outcomes may decline. In sensitive sectors such as immigration, where discretion is exercised in document approval and border management, informal influence may directly affect fairness and efficiency.

Globally, studies on public administration highlight the risks associated with patronage and identity-based influence in bureaucratic systems. In the United States and parts of Europe, civil service reforms have historically aimed at insulating public institutions from political and social interference through merit-based recruitment and oversight mechanisms (Fernandez & Cheema, 2024). Evidence shows that countries with strong merit systems experience higher levels of administrative effectiveness and public trust. In contrast, research from countries experiencing weak institutional controls indicates that informal networks can influence recruitment, promotions, and procurement processes, thereby affecting implementation outcomes (Pilbeam et al., 2023). For instance, studies on governance reforms in Eastern Europe demonstrate that reducing patronage practices improves efficiency and reduces corruption risks (World Bank, 2023). These findings suggest that controlling informal influence is central to effective policy execution.

In Africa, the interaction between informal social networks and formal state institutions remains a significant governance issue. Teixeira (2024) explains that in many African states, territorial authority and identity-based affiliations influence administrative structures and decision-making. A relevant case is Nigeria, where the federal character principle was introduced to manage ethnic diversity in public service appointments. Although designed to promote inclusivity, studies show that ethnic considerations continue to shape bureaucratic processes, sometimes affecting efficiency and merit-based systems (Upadhyaya, 2025). Similarly, research in Ghana indicates that informal political and kinship networks can shape public sector recruitment and resource allocation, influencing implementation outcomes in key government agencies (Osei & Malang, 2016). These regional experiences demonstrate that identity-based influence within state institutions can have direct implications for service delivery and institutional performance.

In Kenya, ethnicity and clan affiliations remain central to political and administrative organization. Although the 2010 Constitution promotes merit, equity, and national unity in public appointments, ethnic balancing and informal influence continue to shape governance outcomes (Makasa, 2020). The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC, 2022) reports that favoritism and undue influence remain significant risks in public institutions, potentially undermining efficiency and public confidence. The Government of Kenya (2023) has introduced reforms within the State Department for Immigration and Citizen Services aimed at digitization, improved service delivery, and enhanced accountability. However, as an institution that exercises discretion in document issuance and border enforcement, the Department of Immigration operates in an environment where informal influence may affect operational decisions. Despite extensive debate on ethnicity and governance in Kenya, limited empirical research has examined how clan control specifically affects the execution of initiatives within the Department of Immigration (Riziki, 2021). Execution in this context refers to timely implementation of projects, adherence to regulations, equitable service delivery, and achievement of strategic objectives. Understanding whether clan control influences these outcomes is essential for strengthening institutional integrity and improving immigration service performance.

Statement of the Problem

The Department of Immigration Services plays a strategic role in safeguarding Kenya's borders, managing citizenship processes, and facilitating international mobility. Efficient execution of its initiatives is vital for national security, economic development, and global cooperation. The Government of Kenya has undertaken modernization reforms to enhance transparency and efficiency within immigration services (Elryah, 2022). However, governance challenges in Kenya's public sector continue to raise concerns about the influence of informal networks on institutional performance. Studies indicate that identity-based affiliations may shape administrative appointments and operational decisions within state institutions (Onyango, 2024). The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC, 2022) further notes that favoritism and undue influence reduce efficiency and weaken public trust in government agencies. While

ethnicity and governance have been widely studied in Kenya, there is limited empirical research focusing specifically on how clan control affects the execution of initiatives within the Department of Immigration (Omulo & Williams, 2017). Without clear evidence, policymakers lack sufficient data to determine whether informal influence significantly impacts project implementation, procedural compliance, and equitable service delivery. This study therefore seeks to address this gap by investigating the impact of clan control on the execution of Department of Immigration initiatives in Kenya.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of clan control on the execution of Department of Immigration initiatives in Kenya.

Research Hypothesis

H03: Clan control has no significant influence on the execution of Department of Immigration initiatives in Kenya.

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

Theoretical Review

Agency Theory

Agency Theory, originally developed by Jensen and Meckling in 1976 and further refined by contemporary scholars, provides a framework for understanding the relationship between principals (those who delegate work) and agents (those who perform the work) in organizational settings (Vitolla et al., 2020). The theory posits that agency problems arise when there is a divergence of interests between principals and agents, information asymmetry, and difficulties in monitoring agent behavior. In the context of public sector organizations, agency relationships exist at multiple levels, including between the government and departmental heads, between senior management and project managers, and between supervisors and frontline staff (Asif et al., 2023). Within the Department of Immigration, agency theory helps explain how clan control mechanisms may create or exacerbate agency problems. When agents (project managers and staff) have stronger allegiances to their clan or ethnic networks than to the organizational principals, they may pursue objectives that serve their clan interests rather than organizational goals (Ström et al., 2021). This misalignment of interests can manifest in various ways, including biased hiring decisions, preferential resource allocation to clan members, and selective sharing of information that benefits one's network rather than the organization as a whole.

Furthermore, clan control can affect monitoring mechanisms, which are central to addressing agency problems. Traditional agency theory suggests that principals use monitoring systems, performance incentives, and control mechanisms to align agent behavior with organizational objectives (Fama & Jensen, 2020). However, when strong clan-based networks exist, they may

create informal accountability structures that compete with formal monitoring systems. Agents may feel accountable primarily to their clan leaders or ethnic networks, thereby reducing the effectiveness of formal organizational controls and performance management systems (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2021). The theory also highlights the role of information asymmetry in agency relationships. In organizations where clan control is prevalent, information may flow more freely within clan networks than through formal organizational channels, creating pockets of information advantage that certain groups can exploit to their benefit (Verbeeten & Speklé, 2022). This selective information sharing can undermine transparency, hinder effective decision-making, and compromise the execution of immigration initiatives that require coordinated action based on complete and accurate information. Agency theory provides valuable insights for understanding how clan control influences the execution of Department of Immigration initiatives by highlighting the potential for conflicts of interest, challenges in monitoring and accountability, and the impact of information asymmetries created by informal networks. This theoretical lens helps identify specific mechanisms through which clan control may affect project execution and suggests potential interventions to better align agent behavior with organizational objectives.

Empirical Review

Clan Control and Organizational Performance

Recent empirical research has increasingly examined how informal control systems, including clan-based networks, influence organizational performance in public institutions. Li et al. (2024) investigated the role of clan control in European public sector organizations using survey data and case analyses from 45 institutions. Their findings indicated a curvilinear relationship between clan control and performance outcomes. Moderate levels of shared values and internal cohesion improved coordination, trust, and project execution. However, excessive reliance on informal networks reduced innovation, limited external accountability, and encouraged conformity in decision-making. The study concluded that clan control can enhance performance when balanced with strong formal governance systems. Although insightful, the research was conducted in relatively stable bureaucratic environments, which differ from African public sector dynamics where identity-based affiliations may carry stronger political implications.

In the African context, Ncube and Hlatywayo (2022) explored informal networks and project implementation in Zimbabwe and South Africa through qualitative interviews with senior public officials. Their findings showed that clan and ethnic affiliations often shaped team selection and access to strategic resources. In several cases, project managers prioritized loyalty over competence, leading to skill gaps and implementation delays. However, the study also acknowledged that informal networks sometimes facilitated quicker problem-solving where formal procedures were slow. The authors emphasized that the effect of clan control on performance depends on the strength of institutional checks and accountability systems.

Within Kenya, empirical evidence suggests that ethnic and clan-based affiliations influence organizational outcomes. Ongonge et al. (2024), in a study of Kenyan state corporations, found that informal control mechanisms rooted in ethnic networks were negatively associated with project success indicators such as adherence to timelines and budget compliance. Organizations characterized by strong clan influence reported reduced knowledge sharing across diverse groups and increased internal tensions. Similarly, Odhiambo and Njihia (2022) found that teams formed along clan lines demonstrated short-term cohesion but performed poorly in complex projects requiring diverse expertise and innovation. Diverse, merit-based teams ultimately achieved better long-term outcomes. Collectively, these studies indicate that while clan control may foster internal solidarity, excessive reliance on informal networks undermines merit, innovation, and accountability, thereby weakening organizational performance. However, limited research has examined how these dynamics specifically affect the execution of initiatives within specialized government departments such as immigration services.

Execution of Department of Immigration Initiatives in Kenya

The execution of immigration initiatives in Kenya has increasingly focused on modernization, digital transformation, and strengthening border security. According to the Government of Kenya (2023), the State Department for Immigration and Citizen Services has implemented reforms aimed at digitizing passport processing, enhancing biometric registration systems, and improving border management infrastructure. These initiatives are designed to enhance efficiency, transparency, and service accessibility. Recent governance assessments indicate that digital reforms in Kenya's immigration sector have reduced processing time for passports and improved tracking systems, though operational bottlenecks remain (World Bank, 2023). The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC, 2022) further reports that while digitization reduces direct human discretion, institutional weaknesses such as favoritism and limited internal oversight continue to pose risks to effective service delivery.

Regionally, migration governance studies emphasize that the success of immigration reforms depends heavily on institutional integrity and professional capacity (Triandafyllidou, 2020). In Kenya, immigration services operate within a sensitive security environment that requires coordination between multiple agencies. Research shows that implementation challenges in public sector reforms often stem from internal administrative inefficiencies and weak accountability mechanisms rather than policy design flaws (OECD, 2021). Despite ongoing reforms, empirical research specifically examining internal organizational dynamics within Kenya's Department of Immigration remains limited. Existing literature highlights modernization efforts but provides minimal analysis of how internal control systems, including informal clan-based influence, may shape execution outcomes. This study addresses this gap by examining how clan control influences the execution of immigration initiatives, including passport processing, visa services, and border management programs.

3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study will adopt a causal research design to examine how clan control influences the execution of Department of Immigration initiatives in Kenya. The design will enable analysis of the relationship between clan control (independent variable) and project execution performance (dependent variable). The unit of analysis will be the Department of Immigration, while the unit of observation will consist of 67 employees, including Project Managers, Chief Finance Managers, Accounting Officers, Procurement and Legal Officers, and Technical Engineers. Given the small population size, a census approach will be used, supported by purposive sampling to select knowledgeable staff directly involved in project implementation. Primary data will be collected using a structured questionnaire. Collected data will be coded and analyzed using SPSS, employing descriptive statistics and multiple regression analysis to determine the extent to which clan control affects initiative execution. Results will be presented using tables, charts, and narrative interpretation.

4.0 RESEARCH FINDING AND DISCUSSION

Response Rate

This section presents the distribution of target respondents and actual responses received from the study conducted at the Department of Immigration in Kenya.

Table 1: Response Rate

Category	Target Population	Actual Responses
Senior Management	15	14
Middle Management	25	23
Supervisory Staff	27	23
Total	67	60

Source: Field Data (2025)

Out of the 67 participants targeted in the study, 60 responded to the structured questionnaires, representing a response rate of 89.6%. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003), a response rate of 50% is adequate for analysis and reporting, 60% is good, and 70% and above is excellent. The achieved response rate of 89.6% is therefore excellent and demonstrates the willingness of participants to contribute to the study and reflects the significance of the research topic. This high response rate enhances the validity and reliability of the research findings while minimizing non-response bias (Baruch & Holtom, 2008). The distribution shows strong participation across all management levels, with senior management achieving 93.3% (14 out of 15), middle management 92.0% (23 out of 25), and supervisory staff 85.2% (23 out of 27), indicating representative coverage of the organizational hierarchy.

Descriptive Analysis

Descriptive analysis summarizes and organizes data using statistical measures such as mean and standard deviation, providing insights into patterns, trends, and distributions within the dataset.

The study employed a 5-point Likert scale where: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly Agree. Mean scores were interpreted as follows: 1.00-1.80 (Very Low), 1.81-2.60 (Low), 2.61-3.40 (Moderate), 3.41-4.20 (High), and 4.21-5.00 (Very High).

Clan Control

The study examined the influence of clan control on the execution of Department of Immigration initiatives in Kenya. The results are displayed in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Clan Control

Statement	N	Mean	Std. Dev.
Adequate resources are often allocated to the project team based on clan affiliations rather than merit and project needs.	60	2.85	1.124
Professional and technical expertise are often supplied based on clan connections rather than competence and qualifications.	60	2.92	1.087
Staff appointments to various management levels are typically influenced by clan considerations rather than technical, interpersonal, or conceptual skills.	60	3.68	0.943
Project team members for specific initiatives are typically selected based on clan loyalty rather than professional competence.	60	3.45	1.056
Clan-based networks create barriers to clear communication and interaction among project team members from different ethnic backgrounds.	60	3.52	0.987
Project activities and outcomes are sometimes compromised due to clan-based interests that extend beyond specified project objectives.	60	3.38	1.134
Clan control mechanisms often supersede formal organizational control systems in decision-making processes.	60	3.71	0.896
Average	60	3.36	0.746

Source: Field Data (2025)

The findings in Table 4.2 reveal moderate to high levels of clan control within the Department of Immigration in Kenya, indicating a substantial influence on initiative execution. Respondents strongly agreed that clan control often supersedes formal organizational systems in decision-making (M=3.71, SD=0.896), consistent with Kiggundu (1989) and Blunt and Jones (1992), who observed that ethnic and kinship ties frequently override bureaucratic structures in Sub-Saharan African organizations. Staff appointments and promotions were reported to be heavily influenced by clan considerations (M=3.68, SD=0.943), corroborating Nyambegera (2002) and Hyden (2006), who noted that ethnic loyalties often take precedence over merit-based systems in African public institutions. Clan-based networks were also found to impede communication and collaboration among project teams from different ethnic backgrounds (M=3.52, SD=0.987), aligning with Osaghae and Suberu (2005) and Horowitz (1985), who highlighted how ethnic

divisions create in-group versus out-group dynamics. Project team selection frequently favored clan loyalty over professional competence (M=3.45, SD=1.056), supporting Kamoche (2002) and Ekeh (1975), who emphasized the dual influence of formal rules and ethnic obligations in organizational behavior. Additionally, respondents indicated that project activities and outcomes are sometimes compromised by clan interests (M=3.38, SD=1.134), reflecting Wanyande (2009) and Chabal and Daloz (1999), who demonstrated that ethnic patronage networks can displace formal objectives. Resource allocation and technical expertise provision were also moderately influenced by clan connections (M=2.85–2.92), consistent with Mbaku (2010) on rent-seeking through ethnic networks. The overall mean of 3.36 (SD=0.746) confirms that clan control exerts a moderate to high influence on immigration initiative execution, highlighting the risk it poses to professionalism, meritocracy, and organizational effectiveness within the Department.

Execution of Department of Immigration Initiatives in Kenya

The study examined the execution of Department of Immigration initiatives in Kenya, focusing on stakeholder satisfaction, quality of outcomes, return on investment, value for money, timeliness, staff competence, and technological infrastructure. The results are displayed in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Execution of Immigration Initiatives

Statement	N	Mean	Std. Dev.
Stakeholders are typically quite satisfied with the outcomes of our immigration initiatives and service delivery.	60	2.78	1.095
Immigration initiative outcomes are typically of high quality, meeting international standards and stakeholder expectations.	60	2.95	1.132
Immigration initiatives often yield a significant return on investment in terms of improved border security, service efficiency, and revenue generation.	60	2.68	1.154
The organization's efforts in executing immigration initiatives are often worth the financial and human resources invested in them.	60	2.82	1.087
Immigration initiatives are completed within scheduled timelines and budgets.	60	2.73	1.176
Immigration staff demonstrate high levels of competence and professionalism in executing their duties.	60	3.12	1.043
Technology and infrastructure supporting immigration initiatives are adequate and effective.	60	2.58	1.198
Average	60	2.81	0.982

Source: Field Data (2025)

The findings in Table 3 indicate generally low to moderate performance in the execution of Department of Immigration initiatives in Kenya, with an overall mean of 2.81 (SD=0.982), suggesting significant challenges in planning, implementing, and delivering these initiatives. Staff competence and professionalism recorded the highest mean score (M=3.12, SD=1.043), reflecting

moderate agreement that personnel possess adequate skills, yet this remains insufficient for optimal service delivery. In contrast, technology and infrastructure received the lowest score ($M=2.58$, $SD=1.198$), highlighting inadequate ICT support, which likely hampers efficiency, transparency, and compliance with modern immigration standards. This aligns with findings by Mutuku and Mahihu (2014), who identified weak technological capacity as a constraint in Kenyan public institutions. Stakeholder satisfaction was also low ($M=2.78$, $SD=1.095$), indicating general dissatisfaction with service outcomes, consistent with Transparency International (2019), which reported delays, inefficiencies, and corruption as drivers of poor public perception.

Quality of outcomes ($M=2.95$, $SD=1.132$) and value for money ($M=2.82$, $SD=1.087$) were below average, suggesting initiatives often fail to meet international benchmarks or justify resources invested, echoing Migai Akech (2010) on suboptimal resource utilization. Similarly, initiatives struggled to meet timelines and budgets ($M=2.73$, $SD=1.176$), reflecting systemic project management weaknesses identified by Aosa (2011). These findings reveal persistent implementation challenges across multiple dimensions, including technology, stakeholder satisfaction, efficiency, and resource management. The patterns observed suggest that informal clan-based control mechanisms may exacerbate these challenges by undermining merit-based processes, weakening accountability, and reducing organizational capacity to execute immigration initiatives effectively.

Inferential Analysis

Inferential statistics allow for the generalization of findings from the sample to the entire population and provide insights into the strength and significance of relationships between variables. The analysis employed simple linear regression to assess the predictive power of clan control on initiative execution performance.

Model Summary

Table 4 investigates the goodness of fit of the regression model, assessing how well clan control explains the variance in the execution of immigration initiatives. The model summary provides key indicators of the overall explanatory power of the independent variable.

Table 4: Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error
.654	.428	.418	0.7499

a. Predictors: (Constant), Clan Control

Source: Field Data (2025)

The R value of 0.654 indicates a strong negative relationship between clan control and initiative execution. Clan control explains 42.8% of the variance in execution performance, demonstrating substantial predictive power. The model shows a reasonable fit, suggesting reliable predictions.

These findings align with institutional theory, which posits that informal arrangements, such as clan-based networks, significantly shape organizational outcomes (North, 1990; Dia, 1996).

ANOVA of the Regression Model

Table 5 investigates the overall significance of the regression model, assessing whether clan control has a statistically significant impact on the execution of immigration initiatives. The ANOVA test determines whether the relationship observed is likely to exist in the broader population or is merely a product of sampling variation.

Table 5: ANOVA

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F
Regression	24.586	1	24.586	43.737
Residual	32.597	58	0.562	
Total	57.183	59		

a. Dependent Variable: Execution of Immigration Initiatives

b. Predictors: (Constant), Clan Control

Source: Field Data (2025)

The ANOVA results show that the regression model is statistically significant, with an F value of 43.737 and a significance level of 0.000 ($p < 0.001$). This indicates that clan control has a highly significant impact on the execution of Department of Immigration initiatives. The highly significant p-value ($p < 0.001$) provides strong evidence that the relationship between clan control and initiative execution is not due to chance but represents a genuine relationship in the population. These results confirm that clan control is a meaningful predictor of immigration initiative performance and that the regression model is appropriate for the data. This finding is consistent with research by Leonard (1987), who demonstrated that ethnic-based patronage systems in African bureaucracies significantly impair organizational effectiveness and service delivery.

Regression Coefficients

Table 6 presents the regression coefficients, which indicate the direction and magnitude of the relationship between clan control and the execution of immigration initiatives. The coefficients provide insight into how changes in clan control influence initiative execution performance.

Table 6: Regression Coefficients

Model	B	Std. Error	t
(Constant)	5.247	0.342	15.342
Clan Control	-0.726	0.110	-6.613

a. Dependent Variable: Execution of Immigration Initiatives

Source: Field Data (2025)

The regression coefficients reveal a significant negative relationship between clan control and the execution of immigration initiatives ($\beta = -0.726$, $p < 0.001$). The negative beta coefficient indicates that for each unit increase in clan control, the execution of immigration initiatives decreases by

0.726 units. This is a substantial effect size, demonstrating that clan control has a strong detrimental impact on initiative execution. The magnitude of this coefficient suggests that clan control is not merely a minor influence but rather a major determinant of organizational performance in immigration service delivery. The standardized beta coefficient of -0.654 (derived from the correlation coefficient R) indicates that clan control is a strong predictor of immigration initiative execution, with the negative sign confirming an inverse relationship. The t-value of -6.613 with a significance level of $p < 0.001$ provides robust evidence that this relationship is statistically significant and unlikely to be due to random variation. The high absolute value of the t-statistic further confirms the strength and reliability of the relationship. These findings support the theoretical arguments by Ouchi (1979) and Eisenhardt (1985) that organizational control mechanisms significantly influence organizational outcomes.

5.0 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY

The study examined the influence of clan control on the execution of initiatives within the Department of Immigration in Kenya. The findings indicate a clear and significant negative relationship between clan control and effective initiative implementation. Descriptive results show that clan considerations moderately influence staff appointments, team selection, communication patterns, and internal decision-making processes. This suggests that clan influence is embedded in the Department's daily operations rather than being an isolated occurrence. In contrast, the execution of immigration initiatives was rated below average. Weaknesses were observed in technology and infrastructure, timely completion of projects, cost management, stakeholder satisfaction, and overall value for money. Although staff competence recorded moderate levels, performance outcomes remain unsatisfactory for a critical public service institution. Regression analysis confirmed that clan control is a strong predictor of initiative execution and explains a substantial proportion of performance variation. The results demonstrate that increased clan influence leads to reduced effectiveness in project implementation.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The study concluded that clan control negatively affects the execution of immigration initiatives in Kenya. Clan-based considerations in appointments, team formation, and resource allocation weaken merit-based management practices that are essential for effective public service delivery. When informal clan interests override formal organizational procedures, project quality declines, timelines are not met, and resources are not used efficiently. The findings show that clan influence disrupts communication, limits fair competition, and shifts focus away from institutional goals toward group loyalty. This weakens accountability and reduces stakeholder confidence in the Department's services. As a result, the Department faces challenges in delivering efficient, transparent, and reliable immigration services. The study further concludes that the coexistence of formal administrative rules and informal clan expectations creates confusion in decision-making and undermines professional standards. Sustainable improvement in initiative execution will therefore require deliberate efforts to reduce clan-based influence and strengthen merit-driven

systems. Addressing these structural challenges is essential for improving institutional performance and restoring public trust in immigration services.

7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

The study recommended that the Department of Immigration should strengthen merit-based recruitment, selection, and promotion systems. Transparent and competitive processes must guide appointments and career progression to ensure that competence and performance determine advancement. Clear documentation of selection criteria and structured evaluation procedures should be consistently applied to reduce bias. The Department should also reinforce formal decision-making systems by clearly defining policies, procedures, and accountability mechanisms for all initiatives. Regular audits, monitoring frameworks, and performance reviews should be institutionalized to ensure compliance with established rules and to limit informal interference. Leadership should actively promote a culture of professionalism, fairness, and national identity above clan loyalty. Continuous training on ethics, diversity management, and inclusive practices should be conducted to strengthen professional standards. Leaders must model impartial decision-making and enforce consequences where clan influence undermines performance. Investment in digital systems is equally important. Automation of staff deployment, project tracking, and resource allocation can reduce discretionary decisions and increase transparency. Finally, the Department should strengthen stakeholder feedback mechanisms to improve accountability and service quality. External oversight and regular public reporting can help align internal operations with national service expectations and improve overall performance.

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