BEYOND CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING: WHY PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT ALONE CANNOT RESOLVE ELECTORAL CONFLICT IN KENYA

Abstract

Purpose of study: This article examines whether a shift to parliamentary government would resolve Kenya's recurrent electoral conflict. It argues that winner-take-all competition stems from four mechanisms—the indivisible presidency, concentrated appointive power, absence of a credible position for the defeated, and material exclusion stakes—of which constitutional design addresses only two, while an unwritten elite settlement convention performs integrative functions that formal reform promises but cannot deliver.

Methodology: The study employs process tracing of Kenya’s constitutional and electoral record from 1963 to 2026 and comparative analysis of eight jurisdictions. It examines constitutional texts, Supreme Court judgments, electoral declarations, and recent secondary literature, comparing executive forms, electoral alternation, institutional credibility, and conflict intensity across the selected cases.

Findings: The findings indicate that electoral conflict in Kenya is not primarily determined by executive form. Winner-take-all competition arises from the indivisibility of the presidency, concentration of appointive and distributive power, the absence of a credible position for defeated contenders, and the material stakes of political exclusion. Comparative evidence shows that presidential systems can achieve peaceful alternation when electoral commissions and courts are credible, while parliamentary systems can experience prolonged dominance or severe violence. Kenya’s informal elite settlement convention has repeatedly resolved political crises but also reinforced ethnic and regional mobilisation. Devolution appears more consequential than executive redesign because it distributes resources and reduces the stakes of exclusion from national power.

Conclusion: Parliamentary government alone cannot resolve Kenya’s electoral conflict. Reform should first strengthen electoral administration, party regulation, opposition representation, police accountability, oversight institutions, and devolution. Executive redesign should be considered only later and should genuinely divide political power rather than merely relabel the presidency.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21897750